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them in tl.e nation:s fo:.ceign policyo The most immedi8.ta, of
course, is the Pre S:iden·c 1 s new economic program.
years of over-extension has stretched the
bretJ.king point.

U~

Twenty-five

S, economy to the

To avoid a. financib.l collapse .9 the President

found it necessary to combine what amounts to de facto devaluation of the dollar plus a blanket
with a domestic freeze of

~1ages

Other col.L"1tries
had to give in the

w~y

hav~

the

they caused great

dist:res~.!l

a!1d pricee.
long been aware tha.t something

u. s.

nation's financial affairs.

in impo:.ct duties

inc~ease

goV8!nment waa managing the

When theae moves ca;ne, however,
notably in Europe and JA.:;::>an.

Whe;~

is feared abroad is not so much the mcves themselves but what
they could

por~end.

At

6~ake

is their export

m~~kets

in the

United States and, hence, the possible evaporation of a grea·c
thei::c
ueal of /~. in-Gerna tion21.l purchardi."lg vn:er

0

It is U.."l.derstan.dable, in the circumstances that the
5earch for new economic aligi.1mer.ci;s has inten3ified .

Tr.e Uni tee

...
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Kingdom is moving, for example, toward the European Economic
Community, now, with the support of France.

Germany and, in

fact, the whole of Western Europa is ten ding toward closer
commercial relationships with Eastern Europen

For its part,

the Soviet Union seems eager to facilitate this shift and, is
actively seeking to promote it through

politi~al

stabilization.

Thu.s, the Soviet governmant has ack..'>'lowledged the legitimacy of
West Berlin as an appendage of West Germany and is pressing
for a wideT agreement which wouldp in effect, legalize the
territorial changes which were effected in Eastern Europe
after World War II, including the division of Germany.
The United States is acquiescing, in these new
trends in Europe) at a pace, however, which seems sometimes
as reluctant as it ia belated.

Uo

too, with regard to the Far East.

s.

policies are changing,

It seems to me, we are

learning, in paying the ter.rible price of Viet Nam, the folly
of ext ending ideological fears ru1d great power animosities

- 4into the inner conflicts of underdeveloped regions.

In the

process of learning, the Vietnamese war has been drained of
meaning for this nation.

It is revealed, now, as a tragic

waste, a revelation that ie reflected in the President's
program of phased troop withdrawals .

In that sense, the war

is over for this nation; regrettably, what has yet to be ended
is the milite.ry involvement.

There is left in Southeast Asia}

the vestiges of mistakes of the past and they continue to
exact a toll of senseless death and devastation.

Or.e way or

another--by the action of the President or the Congress and,
hopefully, by

both~·· these

vestige s must be removed,

It may be tha t an end to the involvement will be
facilitated by changes in the Sino-U. S. relation ship which
the President has been cultivating .

In any event, China seems

to be moving from a phase of isolation into
participation :!.n world affai:!.·o.

o~e

of more active

The effect of this transition
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u. s,

reftiDnse to it may well be causing internal

distress j_n China) not to speak of consternation in the Soviet
Union, in Japan and Taiwan.
There is a point of central significance in these
and similar phenomana of international change.

In a massive

readjustment, the lingering legacies of World War II are being
liquidated once and for all.
shifts in outlook and
the

What is occurring is a series of

alig1~ents

of policy in many parts of

It is a cataclysmic process, analogous to the

world~

geological adjustments of the earth's crust when pent-up
stresses give

·~ay

along fault lines to produce a ne;-1 equilibriu:n.

The international upheaval, like its geological counterpart,
causes sharp reverberations which are both wi6espread and
unsettling ~

It is &omewhat surprising that so many historic
dislocations should linger for a quarter century afte::- the
hontilities of World Wu· II .

In the past, mattera of thio

- 6 kind have often been settled more promptly--as they 1·1ere at
the close of World War I or as they were a century earlier
following the Napoleonic Wars.

The time lag after World War

II is ascribable, in partJ to the peculiar circumstances of
peace when the guns fell silent in 191+5o

What had been a

united coalition of victorious military allies, quickly split
apart into mutually distrustful armed camps organized around
antagonistic ideologies.

Hovering over this split was the

unprecedented threat of nuclear destruction.
There are those who contend that it was the ultimate
reality of

nuc~ear

power which) alone, inhibited the post-war

antagonists from rushing into another direct and more deedly
confrontation .

Roever that may be, the avoidauce of a major

confrontation between the two ideologies seems to have been
bought, at least on our part, at the high cost of many peripheral confrontations, of '\'lhich Viet Nam is the most recent
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and, one would hope, the last.

It was bought, too, at the

price of lingering fears and suspicions about the intentions
of both sides.

In consequence, there have been massive dis-

ruptions of important domestic priorities in order to permit
a wasteful indulgence in a fierce and costly arms competition
which persists to this day.
We have, indeed, suffered what Shakespear called
"the cankers of a long peace" and can welcome in prir..ciple,
I believe, the present series of economic and political adjustmenta.

They do hold

p~omise

of neutralizing the unhappy

legacies of a war fought twenty-five years ago.
Some of the adjustments involve the removal of
legal straitjackets which may come to be regarded, someday,
as having been extended exerciGes in ideological rigidity
and national pride.

The long delay stems, in part, from the

fact that the United States chose to engage in the diplomacy
of non-recognition of

Soviet~~ictated

territorial changes after

- 8 the
World War II and/consequences of the Chinese Revolution.
For what seemed good and ample reasons at the time, it was
felt necessary to cling to the pre-war territorial status
quo in Europe, particularly with regard to Germany and the
pre-revolutionary political status quo with regard to China.
We are coming to realize, however, that such policies extended
indefinitely are self-defeating and contrary to our own best
interests.

That is usually the case with policies based on

dead fictions as opposed to living circumstances.
While changes in the legal perspective of our polic ies
are certainly of significance, they are overshadowed for the
moment by the more sweeping adjustments which seek to accommodate to contemporary economic realities.

I n general, these

adjustments reflect the fact that the United States, having
served in a variety of roles, as the world's chief banker,
policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the chief

- 9 pioneer :..r. outer space, has now approaclled the limits of its
economic capcity and that :;orne of the burdens have to be
redistributed.
It is notable, I believe, that the current adjustments have concentrated on the commercial-financial elements
of our international position--to the exclusion, unfortur,stely,
of other over-extended roJros abroad, which I shall discuss
shortly.

However, I would like to take a moment to consider

at this point what has occurred under the President's new
economic program.

Essentially the program involves two basic

elements of our commercial-financial relationships with other
nations.

The first is accessibility to markets, that is, the

extent to which ec..ch

natio~

opens its bo:::-ders to the competing

products of others.

The second is the method of

the settling of accounts between the nations.

p~ments ~

or
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In both spheres the economic power of the United
States Las been preeminent for the past quarter century.
U. S. markets have absorbed vast quantities of goods from
other nations and sent abroad even greater quantities.

This

nation has led world policy, notably in the so-called Kennedy
round of tariff negotiations, into an era of vastly expanded
international trade through the reciprocal removal of trade
barriers .
At the same time, the U. S. has been at the core-the central banker, if you will--of the international paymentn
system.

The settling of accounts between nations has been

based for a quarter of a century on the dollar and on its
convertibility into gold.

The system worked well as long as

other nations were prepar e d to hold dollars in their reserves
or had free access to U.

s.

gold.

Neither of these conditions

remains fully operative 0t thi3 time.

So a s earch for new

device s to facilitate financial exchange is underway .

In
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recent

intern4tion~l

for the

n·~a.lignmen'C

conferences, there h&ve been
of V.fl.lues among the Vfl.riout;

prnpo~~ls

curr~ncies,

all acknowledging a leHsening of the relR.tive vi\lue of the
dollar.

There

internation~l

h~ve

also been proposaln for deviging an

substitute for the

in the international payments

doll~r

as the

centr~l

element

~yst~m.

ProposAls of this sort reflect, in my .judgment,
both

B

healthy decline of others in their economic d2pendency

on the United States as well as an uhheA.lthy loss of confidenc-:;
in the stability of the United States economic structure.
Cle~rly,

the "temporary" eurtax

concern abroad.
exporting

n~tinns

It is

8.11

m~-

imports causes the deepest

underetanda.ble concern in mnjor

as it ought to be on our part .

In my

judgment, the eurtailment of international trade which is
implicit in thifl measure is not the

be~t

wAy, in terms of the

interests of the people of this nation, to bring our international payment a into

bette~

balance ,

If, for no

o ·:~~'lcr

reason, the new import levy, by raising the price of foreign
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goods, creates a

p~·edisposition

to higher prices fdr similar

goods within the United States.
Because of immediate difficulties, we should not lose
sight of the fact that the era of expanding international trade
which we have fostered for two decades may go down as one of
the truly positive advances in international relations in the
20th century.

It hae stimulated a highly useful

eco~omic

exchange that has strengthened the fabric of world stability.
It has served to underwrite, too, a long period of mutual
economic well-being and cultural enrichment.

Necessary though

they may be, the new economic policies are, at best, temporary
expedients.

Without indulging, I hope, in excessive hindsight,

I am bound to say that the adjustments might have been easier
for us and all the world, had we faced up to our predicament
at an earlier date and proceeded in a more measuYe6 way to
negotiate the necessary relief.
So far, the other principal trading nations have
eschewed acts of reprisaL
does exist,

That unfortunate possibility,

however:~

Should there be a trade war, it would unravel the

3trands of a beneficial interdependence which have
carefully over the past two dec~des.

b ~ en

woven so
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In the circumstancesJ I endorse fully the President ' s
stress on the

temporary

nature of the surtax and his emphatic

opposition to a return to economic isolationism.

The possibility

of an inadvertant slide into what is eschewed, however, is not to
be overlooked.

To avoid it, it seems to me that we must take

more fundamental steps to redress the economic balance than are
contained in the New Economic Policy.

We need to go beyond the

negative sanctions so far invoked and deal with what, largely,
precipitated the necessity for them in the first place.
This brings us to the non commercial aspects of the
nation s

~nternational

economic difficulties.

Our present

problem of balance of payments is not so much one of buying
too much and selling too little of goods and services in inter national commerce, the fact iR that, for years, we have sold
far more than we have bought.

Rather, the difficulty arises,

in major part, from the spending of vast amounts of public funds
ln order to maintain an outmoded military - diplomatic position in

.

•,

' 14 the world.

Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that position

flow overseas just as surely as those which go for imports of
goods from other nations.

Dollars spent at home to backstop

that position contribute just as certainly to inflationary
pressures as any other non-productive expenditure in the
federal budget.
In my judgment, we are paying exorbitantly--in
billions of dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices
which are simply out of date and which have little to do with
the security and welfare of the peopl e of the nation.

Like

other legacies of World War II, these policies and practices
are in urgent need of revision.
There is no greater urgency than the liquidation of
the war in Viet Nam.

Ending the war is the most compelling

business of this nation.

The reason why that is so is obviously

not only a matter of cost; before all else, Viet Nam is a human
tragedy which tears at the fibers of the nation's cohesion.

- 15 Nevertheless, VietNam is a root cause of the nation's present
economic difficulties.

What is involved is an astronomical levy

of government expenditure on the nation ' s economy in order to
finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of $130
billion.

This expenditure has burdened the productive economy

at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and inflation.

Hence,

it has reduced the competitive position of the nation's commerce
in the world.
In two and a half years, it should be noted, the
President has brought about a significant reduction of the
cost of the involvement in Viet Nam.
tion has been, it is all to the good.

Prolonged as the reduc
It is to be hoped, how-

ever, that what is being attempted is not simply a gradual
tapering off of the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residue.
In Viet Nam, that would still involve, for many years, in my
judgment, continuing expenditures of billions in aid to the
Saigon government as well as U.S. forces in coastal enclaves
in order to shore up a regime with few roots in its own

~eople.
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It wou l d be a continuation of a mistaken war by other means.
It would be a way of being involved without seeming to be involved.

Even if it were possible to attain, it would be a

solution that is ill-suited to the needs of either Viet Nam
or the United States.
The Senate has tried and is now trying, again, to
establish a date certain for a total withdrawal of U. S. forces
as the policy of this nation.

Since definite assurances do not

yet exist on this point, it can be expected that the matter will
be pressed in the Congress _ it will be pressed again and again
until the involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland ends,
lock, stock and barrel.
As in Southeast Asia, this nation s economy is carrying in Europe another archaic burden in the name of national
defense.

Two decades ago, the North Atlantic Treaty joined,

in a common fate with Western Europe, the free survival of this
nation.

Insofar as I am concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty

was valid then and remains

pertinen~

to the nation ; s defense

- 17 need s today> it is not the treaty of alliance which is archaic >
rather, it is the bureaucratic military structure of NATO which
has grown up in its name that stands in need of adjustment.
NATO continues to correspond, today, to circumstances
which were defined before many of you were born.
~he

At that time

free societies of Western Europe were heavily dependent on

the United States and the fear of communist totalitarian takeovers was great.

In terms of today ' s circumstances, NATO is

over··staffed, over-manned, over-officered and over-financed
by this nation.

Of the budget of the Department of Defense,

about q;l4 billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO.

Over

a half-million American servicemen and dependents are consigned
to Europe.
That is an immense diversion of public resources.
Yet, the basic question of NATO is not cost.

If a commitment

of that magnitude were essential for the security of the nation
and the stability of peace, of course, it should be made .

More
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to the point, however, is whether a U. S. deployment of that
size and composition has relevance to the situation in Europe
a quarter of a century after World War II.

In this connection,

I returned just a month ago from a series of consultations in
seven nations in Western Europe.

The overwhelming mood of

Europe is that of detente and peace , it is not of confrontation
and war.

The emphasis is on reconciliation , it is on intra-

European trade, technolog ical exchange, travel and other cultural
interchange.

It is not on military power or fear.

Only in NATO

are the game s of war still played with any sense of expectancy
or conviction.
In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the
European nations are prepared to have us shoulder the prepon d erant costs of the organization so long as we are prepared to
do so.

They have no readiness, not to speak of eagerness, to

increase their own role or expenditures for NATO.

While they

want to maintain the North Atlantic Alliance, it is doubtful

-- 19 -

that the Europeans see the need of the present force levels
of NATO since they do not meet their commitments to them and
have not done so for many years.

It has seemfd to me for a

long time that a substantial reduction in our detlloyment in
Europe is possible and desirable, even as similar steps have
already been taken by the United Kingdom, Canada and others.
Let me emphasize my belief that we do need the North
Atlantic Treaty and Alliance and we do need to preserve the
structure of NATO as an element - in-being of western defense
and unity.

But I also believe the organization can be trimmed

to a streamlined standby force without danger to our security
or the stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to
the well-being of thl s nation.
Specifically, I have recommended that the United

Stat e ~

undertake a reduction of its force commitment to NATO by at
least 50 per cent, leaving no more than two U. S. divisions on
the European continent.

Hopefully, the Executive Branch will

- 20 -

take the initiative in this connection because it can do so
without further ado.

If necessary, however, efforts to that

end will continue to be made in the Congress, ·cumbersome ·
though it may be to try to legislate an action of this kind.
It would seem to me des irable, too, that a multinationa l
NATO naval force should take over the Mediterranean patrol, thus
permitting a sharp reduction ln the overwhelming presence of the
U. S. Sixth Fleet in that sea.

In the same vein, s ubstantial

cuts in U. S. command participation i n NATO and th e d es ignation
of a European as the next NATO commander- i n-chi ef would serve t o
reduce the presence of the united States i n v/estern Europe and,
of course, the cost which is entailed in that presence.
Changes of this kind are needed with regard to Europ e
and As i a if we are to adjust our policies effectively to the
realities of the 70's.

I think you will se e that the changes

which I have suggested involve an end to flailing at the fears
of the past.

They have much to do with an end to . 1

,

illusions

of omnipotence and adventurism and a greater sharing of the gl a r e

- 21 -

of leadership which has focused upon this nation for too long.
They have to do, in short, with what the President, I believe,
was talking about when he introduced the ' low profile ' concept
of the Nixon Doctrine.

Unless and until we make these changes,

the new economic policy will be, at best, only a stop gap for
our difficulties.
We may anticipate the most serious consequences both
at home and in our relationships abroad unless we grasp the
extent of the transition in world affairs over the past quarter
of a century.

During these years, we have come only haltingly

through successive and delayed stages of adjustment.

We are

paying now for the time gaps in our official perception and
responses to changing internat i onal realities.

We are paying

for it in the economic faltering at home and, more seriously,
in the tragedy of Viet Nam.
We stand, now, on the threshhold of a new era in whi ch
prime motivations are appeari ng which are other than the fear of
aggression and war.

There may exist a possibility of breaking
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down antagonisms along the gulf separating the Communist states
from those of the Western world.
sure

foot~

Entered with a clear head and

this era may yield the fruits of peace to nations pre-

pared to take the risks of peace.
The promise is there_ it may be that it will fall to
a younger generation to work out that promise.

I hope that your

vision of the world will be far less constrained than ours has
been for the past twenty five years.

With

luck~

you may be able

to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial
defense or of the defense of ideo logical

systems~

an e lement of human survival and well-being.

but rather as

National resourc e s

can then be committed in far greater degree to the fundamental
problems which know no boundaries of race or nationality:
tion

numbers~

the preservation of natural

resources~

popul&-

pollution

abatement and the enlightenment of the human spirit wherever
however it is oppressed.
Your deliberations here can help to bring that day
closer .

I urge you to continue the quest.

a~d
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down antagonisms along the gulf separating the Communist states
from those of the Western world..

Entered with a clear head and

sure foot, this era may yield the fruits of peace to nations prepared to take the risks of peace.
The promise is there_ it may be that it will fall to
a younger generation to work out that promise.

I hope that your

vision of the world will be far less constrained than ours has
been for the past twenty ·- five years.

With luck, you may be able

to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial
defense or of the defense of ideological systems, but rather as
an element of human survival and well-being.

National resourc e s

can then be committed in far greater degree to the fundamental
problems which know no boundaries of race or nationality:

popul a -

tion numbers, the preservation of natural resources, pollution
abatement and the enlightenment of the human spirit wherever a Dd
however it is oppressed.
Your deliberations here can help to bring t hat day
closer.

I urge you to continue the quest.

